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ABSTRACT 
The Boko Haram terrorism, which began in 2009 has had a devastating impact on the society. So far, 
it has triggered one of the worst humanitarian crises in history and has been responsible for over 30 
thousand deaths with over two million others displaced, mostly in the North-east of the country with 
sizeable spillovers into the neighboring countries of Chad, Niger and Cameroon. Boko Haram’s 
primary goal was to create an Islamic caliphate in the region, and like other terrorist networks, uses 
the unconventional, hit-and-run guerrilla war tactics. This has rendered the insurgency to be a hard 
nut to crack, a phenomenon that is cited as one of the main reasons the group is able to continually 
carry out successful attacks despite being declared “technically defeated”. Hence, this need to seek 
for alternative, ‘unconventional’ media as a tool for counterterrorism. The media, both new and 
traditional have been shown to play a critical role toward the de-Bokoharamization campaign of the 
Nigerian Federal Government in collaboration with its Western partners. However, due to the 
guerrilla tactics nature of the insurgency, human-wearable digital microchip technology such as 
radio frequency identification and wireless body area network systems have been suggested as 
capable of yielding desirable outcomes. Following a critical review of literature and taking from 
Laswell’s communication model, this review article offers a digital communication counterterrorism 
model to complement the state’s efforts toward the anti-terrorism campaign.  
 
Keywords: Boko Haram conflict, de-bokoharamization campaign, digital wristband, human-wearable 
technology, counterterrorism 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the 21st century, the media symbolizes the society and the society is a symbolic 
representation of the media (Croteau & Hoynes, 2019; Siapera, 2018). The media generally, 
whether media of mass communication or new (digital) media play a pivotal role in the 
matrix of terrorism, insurgency and political violence and are put into positions where they 
can magnify or minimize these kinds of acts and their perpetrators, or, of course, they can 
provide coverage that avoids either one of those extremes (Nacos, 2002). The media are 
expected to actively and proactively play pivotal roles to minimize both the actual impacts 
of terrorism.  
The media are always employed to wage psychological warfare on the targets 
through propaganda, heart-and-mind conquest campaigns, de-radicalization and 
reconciliatory efforts of providing incentives for extremists and insurgents to abandon 
violence and seek non-violence ways of seeking redress for their grievances. For instance, 
counter-narratives have been shown to be effective in this regard (Crelinsten, 2017; Othman 
& Mat, 2018). Particularly, counter-narrative messages that foster inter-Islamic sects 
understanding can tremendously undermine the propaganda and extremist ideology of 
Boko Haram which promote hatred among different Islamic sects and label as infidel Muslim 
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individuals and groups that do not follow their ideology (Ngige, Badekale & HammanJoda, 
2016). It is believed that the recruitment and radicalization processes for all suicide bombers 
are excruciatingly emotional (Barkindo, 2013; Bouzar, 2016). It is advisable that for any de-
radicalization, or de-Bokoharamization campaign to be effective and for peace to reign in 
the society, counter-narratives also must be emotional. 
Boko Haram is an Islamist jihadist group based in North-eastern Nigeria. The group 
which is aligned to the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is also active in 
Cameroon, Chad, and Niger republics. Boko Harams claims to propagate a Salafist-jihadist 
teaching of Islam and seeks to establish a caliphate, or Islamic state, in Nigeria. To attain this 
objective, the group has carried out large-scale attacks (mostly suicide bomb attacks) in the 
country, including an attack on the United Nations (UN) headquarters in Abuja in 2011, the 
abduction of nearly 300 Chibok schoolgirls in April 2014,8 the abduction of 111 Dapchi 
schoolgirls in February 2018 and the massacre of the northern Borno State town of Baga 
and surrounding villages in January 2015 which killed about 2,000 people (BBC News, 2015b; 
CFR, 2015; CNN, 2015; Reuters, 2011; UNSC, 2014; USDS, 2016; Washington Post, 2016). 
Boko Haram was founded in 2002 at Kanamma village in northern part of Yobe State 
close to the border with Niger by a Salafist cleric called Muhammad Yusuf. The group later 
moved to Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State. Although Muhammad Yusuf called for the 
formation of an Islamic state in Nigeria, he did not pursue violence to realize his dream at 
that time. However, that approach changed in 2009, when Boko Haram members took up 
arms in response to a government crackdown and the killing of its leader. Ever since then, 
Boko Haram has launched paramilitary campaigns and terrorist attacks increasingly carried 
out by child suicide bombers, targeting the Nigerian Government, civilians and neighbouring 
countries (Barkindo, 2013). The loose security situation in and around Nigeria has enabled 
the terrorists to cross into Cameroon, Chad, and Niger in order to evade Nigerian security 
forces and perpetrate regional attacks. The terrorist group has been responsible for the 
death of over 30,000 (Aljazeera, 2019; Elden, 2014; Zenn, 2018 May) people since 2009.  
In a bid to address the issues associated with engaging the media, especially new 
(digital) media in the counter-Bokoharamism campaign and restore lasting peace in the 
society, extant literature was critically reviewed and themes were derived from which a 
digital communication model proposed for adoption in the counterterrorism and managing 
human vulnerabilities was and recommended for adoption to compliment the 
Government’s efforts toward eradicating Boko Haram terrorism and restoring lasting peace 
in the society. This paper discusses terrorism in a broad perspective, this is followed by a 
discussion about the factors leading to conflicts involving terrorism from global and local 
outlooks. A whole section on Engaging the Media in the Restoration of Peace for National 
Development is dedicated for the main gist of this paper, under which issues surrounding 
the relationships between the media and terrorism was discussed. Also discussed under that 
section is tips on how to engage the media for successful counterterrorism campaign.  
  
BACKGROUND 
Understanding Boko Haram Terrorism 
Boko Haram terrorism has sparked a major humanitarian crisis that looks like religious 
cleansing, or faith cleansing because of its targeting mainly places of worship of both 
Muslims and Christians and later killing more Muslims than people of other faiths. In fact, 
the loss of life caused by Boko Haram (and the war against the group) has been staggering. 
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So far, the conflict has forced more than two million Nigerians from their homes, with 
“profound humanitarian consequences,” claimed nearly 40,000 since 29 May 2011 and 
more than 99,000 lives since February 2017 (CFR, 2012; Premium Times, 2017; Warner & 
Matfess, 2017). 
Concurrently, regional counterinsurgency organizations and the global community 
have been making concerted efforts indefatigably to combat Boko Haram and restore 
peace, prosperity and socio-economic development, which often resulted in limited success. 
According to BBC News, due to the glaring weaknesses and insufficiencies of unilateral 
campaign by Nigeria to combat the terror group between 2010 and 2014, in January 2015 
the AU deployed a 7,500-strong military force to the region. Subsequently, these forces that 
comprised of troops from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Benin metamorphosed into 
the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF), an operation and dedicated to annihilating the 
insurgents (Assanvo, Abatan & Sawadogo, 2016; BBC News, 2015). 
Available records have shown that Boko Haram does not have high-level financing 
structures like other terrorist organizations (ISIL, Al-Qa’ida and the Taliban). The group has 
historically relied largely on erstwhile operations to fund its activities. This further shows 
that Boko Haram has a decentralized network with local commanders required to generate 
revenue to fund their own activities. Some of the most common techniques employed by 
the group to raise fund include abduction of persons for ransoms, kidnapping, extortion of 
various businesses, bank and armed robberies and smuggling. In addition, the group has 
also been known to raise funds by utilizing a network of alliances with other terrorist 
organizations including receiving funding from Al-Qa’ida in the Land of Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM) (Kingsley, Johnson-Rokosu & Olanrewaju, 2015).  
Mass kidnapping of foreigners and civilians for ransom has over the years proven to 
be a profitable method of fundraising (GTI, 2017). In fact, reports indicate that Boko Haram 
has a specialized kidnapping task focuses on the abduction of politicians, business people, 
foreigners, traditional rulers and civil servants with the intention of trading them for large 
sums of money or for the release of captured and/or imprisoned Boko Haram militants 
(Kingsley et al., 2015) for example, in 2013, Boko Haram was paid US$3 million (about N480 
million at the prevailing exchange rates then) in ransom to release a French family of seven 
persons (GTI, 2017). 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Concept of Terrorism  
Terrorism has no single global definition. Agara (2015) has defined it as “propaganda of the 
deed” or “propaganda by deed”. Adora the UN office for Drugs and Crime Prevention in 
1992 defines terrorism as “an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, 
employed by (semi-) clandestine individuals, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal 
or political reasons, whereby – in contrasts to assassination, the direct targets of violence 
are not the main targets (Adora, 2010; Elden, 2014). Another important definition of 
terrorism was given by African Union (AU) in article 1 (3) as: “any act which is a violation of 
the criminal laws of a state party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or 
freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to any person, any number or group of persons 
or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, 
environmental or cultural heritage (Oyeniyi, 2010). 
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The Global Terrorism Index (GTI, 2016), defines terrorism as “the threatened or 
actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, 
religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.” According to this definition, 
terrorism it not merely the physical act of carrying out an attack, but also the psychological 
effect it has on a society for many years afterwards. It has been described as a “highly 
concentrated form of violence, mostly committed in a small number of countries and by a 
small number of groups” (pp. 3, 17). 
Traditionally, the execution of acts of terrorism depend on tactics aimed at creating 
constant fear in society, say, surprise, concealment, deception, stealth and conspiracy. 
Anaedozie enumerated that most known objectives of terrorists include provocation, 
indoctrination, radicalization, media propaganda, insurrection, force, intimidation, creation 
of chaos or societal dislocation, discrediting or destroying a government; crippling economy, 
destroying property and spreading fear for global attention (Anaedozie, 2016; Barkindo, 
2013). The Global Terrorism Index 2016 report has identified five countries have been 
identified as suffering the highest impact from terrorism, namely Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, 
Pakistan and Syria. In 2015, 72% of all terrorism-related deaths occurred in those countries 
and, surprisingly, only four terror groups, namely ISIS, Boko Haram, the Taliban and Al-Qaida 
were responsible for a whopping 74% of all the deaths (GTI, 2016).  
Out of the myriads of tactics and strategies of insurgency available, terrorism has 
been shown to be the preferred choice, especially because of its psychological effects. 
Nearly two decades since the wake of the 21st Century, terrorism (especially on religious or 
faith divides) is increasingly becoming appealing to youth irrespective of their nationality 
and gender. The media are replete with reports about young men and women seeking to 
join terrorist groups folds (mostly from EU countries like Britain, France, Germany, Italy and 
Spain as well as the US and Australia), or are being abducted and indoctrinated (especially in 
Sub-Saharan countries such as Nigeria, Niger, Cameroun, Chad, Mali and Somalia) (Elden, 
2014; Graaf, 1982; Stephens, 2010).  
 
Factors Influencing Terrorism 
Globally, terrorism has had devastating social, economic, cultural and political effects in 
societies across the world, mostly in countries colonized during the 20th Century. A research 
study conducted in the US by Stephens (2010) suggests that there is a correlation between a 
country’s colonial history and terrorism. The study further reveals that colonial history 
linked with ethnolinguistic, political and economic assimilative tendencies are significantly 
associated with circumstances that are more likely to breed terrorism and terrorism-related 
conflicts. This suggest that there are enduring adverse effects of colonialism give rise to 
ethnic, political and economic conflicts which lead to guerrilla attacks (insurgency) and 
ultimately, terrorism (see Figure 1) even when the ethnic groups are unified linguistically 
and politically. This is because, as Stephens (2010) notes, “the colonizers often altered 
traditional ethnic relationships and power structures” (p. 56).  
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Figure 1: Nigerian Police bomb experts inspect the scene of a suicide bomb attack (Source: Getty Images) 
 
Therefore, even though the Boko Haram’s ideological prohibition of Western 
education and Western values were premised on so-called Islamic doctrine, by all means, 
they are fundamentally rooted in the British colonialists’ alteration of the nation’s ethnic 
relationships and political structure. In a nut shell, colonialism can be the root cause of the 
present breed of faith-based or religious terrorism raging across the world, especially in Sub-
Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and South Asia. So, there has been 
collision between the social, cultural, political and economic values imported by colonial 
masters and the indigenous ones; thus, over the decades they ultimately breed militancy 
and terrorism (Abdulazeez, 2016; Barkindo, 2013; Khawaja, 2010; Onyeniyi, 2010). 
Another school of thought links terrorism to factors associated with politics. In his 
famous online article entitled, The International Terrorist Conspiracy Gwynne Dyer (2006, 
June 3, online) that:  
 
Terrorism is a political technique, not an ideology and any group willing to 
use violence in pursuit of its political goals may resort to it…. There are left-
wing terrorists and right-wing terrorists; national terrorist and international 
terrorist; Christian, Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist and atheist terrorists. 
 
 This argument is supported in the 2016 Global Terrorism Index report, which 
succinctly identifies two distinct factors associated with politics that drive terrorism, namely 
state-backed political violence and the presence of a conflict. A vast majority (93%) of the 
terrorist activity that occurred between 1989 and 2014 have been shown to have occurred 
in countries that human rights are bluntly violated, e.g., imprisonment without trial, torture, 
extrajudicial killing and have high tendencies of perpetrating state-sponsored terrorism. 
Similarly, countries already engaged in some forms of local (internal) or international 
conflicts have been shown to have over 90% fatalities associated with terrorism. Then, why 
only about 0.5% of all terrorist attacks took place in countries that did not suffer from a 
political conflict or violence (GTI, 2016)? 
 
New Media and the Challenges of Boko Haram Terrorism: Proposing the Adoption of  
Human-Wearable Digital Technology  
Adamkolo Mohammed Ibrahim, Mohammed Gujbawu & Nassir Abba-Aji 
 
55 
 
E-ISSN: 2289-1528 
https://doi.org/10.17576/JKMJC-2019-3504-04 
 
Statistically significant political factors that have correlates with terrorism are often 
viewed from the development status (developed or developing) of a country. In developed 
and emerging economies (e.g., the Organization of Economic Cooperation for Development, 
OECD countries like Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Turkey), OECD member countries 
with poorer performance on socio-economic factors that can reinforce some of the well-
known drivers of radicalization and extremism such as unemployment among young 
persons, level criminality, access to weapons, militancy and apathy in the electoral process 
have been found to be statistically significant correlates of terrorism. For example, of the 34 
OECD member countries, 21 experienced at least one terrorist attack between 2015 and 
2016, with most fatalities occurring in France and Turkey (GTI, 2017). 
 
The Role of Media in Counterterrorism and Restoration of Peace 
Media publicity and accessibility to the Internet have been consistently shown to influence 
acts of terrorism. Many of the known terrorist groups in the world have at least own an 
online personal account mostly on porous social network sites like Twitter and YouTube, 
which they use to spread propaganda. For example, to demonstrate the degree to which 
ISIS values media publicity and power of the Internet, the group has gone to the extent of 
publishing its own sophisticated propaganda online magazine titled Dabiq, for recruitment 
and proselytization, which was first published on 5 July 2014 in several languages including 
English (Wikipedia, 2017). The Boko Haram group is known for releasing most of its online 
propaganda videos on the Internet (YouTube) and online news media. Sometimes the 
group’s videos and messages are broadcast on Al-Jazeera TV and Sahara Reporters online 
news sites (Mu’azu, 2015). 
Furthermore, whenever terrorism is discussed, media and media-related issues must 
inevitably be considered especially in this era of globalization. Media are the channels which 
connect and bind the various segments of the human society together. From the era of mass 
communication, which is symbolically based on a ‘one-to-all’ basis of information 
dissemination to the present age of information and communication technology (ICT), which 
is largely based on a ‘from-all-to-all’ technique information, communication and publicity 
have always been some of the key functions of the media make them inextricably part and 
parcel of society (Baran & Davis, 2012; Moorthy, Benny, & Gill, 2018).  
Realizing these characteristics of the media, terrorist organizations and groups have 
always overtly or covertly sought to exploit the motivations media could offer to their 
nefarious acts. For instance, Pate and Idris (2017) have shown that in its earlier days, Boko 
Haram members used to invite journalists to cover their terror activities; “indeed”, 
according to Mu’azu (2015) cited in Pate and Idris (2017), “the Boko Haram did trace how 
they were covered by the media because they [Boko Haram] were dictating how the group 
should be reported” (p. 160). In fact, just like terrorists are terrorists because they weaken 
the loose ends of the chain that holds the society using the power of fear, so media are 
watchdog of the society because through thick and thin they bear the risks and costs of 
keeping the society informed of occurrences within it (Pate & Idris, 2017).  
This, though, has created a maze of ambiguity within academic circles with some 
quarters critiquing the media of being a complicit rather than explicit in the 
counterterrorism campaign. Asogwa, Iyere and Attah (2012) cited in Schmid and de Graaf 
(1982) belong in the school of thought that exonerates the media from being complicit in 
terrorism where they stress that, “the media are not simply gatekeepers, neutral or 
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complicit with either state or terrorists, but rather are active agents in the process of the 
construction of information” (p. 178). This underscores the significant role both the mass 
media and new media of communication can be effectively employed in the anti-Boko 
Haram campaign (Mu’azu, 2015; Pate & Hamza, 2017). 
Further, outlining the correlation between terrorism and media, Ibrahim and Hassan 
(2017) demonstrate that terrorist groups do rely on the ‘free’ publicity the media provide 
them with through, e.g., news reporting and user-generated contents shared on social 
media and blog spots online. Hence, just like religious, political and socio-economic factors 
have been shown to significant correlate with terrorism, we confidently believe that media 
publicity directly affects acts of terrorism, and public opinion which is the by-product of 
media publicity in society both directly and indirectly influences the effect of media publicity 
on terrorism (see Figure 2).  
The symbolic symbiotic relationship between the media and terrorism may be a 
funny one. Terrorists possess an overwhelming influence of attracting global attention while 
the media possess a wealth of audiences. There is no doubt that the media possess a larger 
public than terrorists do; and this public who looks onto the media for proper information 
dissemination that would lead to national security and meaningful developments is 
indispensable to the existence of the media. By and large, terrorism receives greater degree 
of coverage from the media (Othman & Mat, 2018) (especially global media organizations 
such as the BBC and CCN) more than do conflict resolution, peace-building and 
developmental achievements in less developed countries. 
Indeed, to perform their duty of being the watchdogs of the society and information 
dissemination, the media do not need the terrorists, but the terrorists would certainly not 
exist in the minds of many people without the media publicity of their activities, thus 
suggesting a linear relationship path (Asogwa et al., 2012; Bilgen, 2012). Arguably, the 
symbiotic relationship between the media and terrorism is rather circumstantial and 
temporary. This is so, because terrorism is more likely to cease with the absence of the 
factors that were responsible for its occurrence (Schmid & de Graaf, 2012) in the society, 
unlike if the relationship were permanently continuous, or circular. However, due to the 
guerrilla tactic nature of the Boko Haram terrorism, conventional mass media may need to 
be complemented with the application of emerging conflict management technologies such 
as human-wearable digital microchip systems. The next section discusses these issues. 
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Figure 2: A diagrammatical representation of the media-terrorism dynamics  
(Source: Ibrahim & Hassan, 2017, p. 32).  
Note: This diagram is divided into four dimensions, namely A: Media categories; B: Types of media content; C: 
The publics (media content consumers) and the impacts of the media content on them; D: Terrorism and issues 
surrounding it; E: Factors driving terrorism 
 
The Use of Human-Wearable Microchip Digital Media Technology in Conflict Management 
Advances in technology are unearthing more and more secrets of the unfathomable uses 
and applications of information and communication technology (ICT) for social and 
economic development. For instance, the use of digital wearables in their various forms 
(e.g., digital wrist band, e-bracelets, etc.) is an ‘emerging technology’ field of research that 
has a lot of potential (Awan, Memon, & Bhutto, 2017). Digital tracking technology has been 
identified as one of the most remarkable revolutionary technologies in use nowadays. 
Tracing the history of the application object tracking technology from post-World War II to 
its use in the 21st Century, the amazing impact of tracking technology becomes evident 
(Covacio, 2003; Rodriguez, 2019).  
Given its novelty, the use of wearables and other similar sensor technologies in both 
humans  and animals (Arya & Bilandi, 2007; Ramli & Ahmad, 2011) is categorized as an 
emerging technology. Wearabes are applied in body area networks (BAN) and extensive 
systems to “provide efficient and reliable services.” (Awan et al., 2017, p. 377). Currently, 
the use of WBAN (Ramli & Ahmad, 2011) in security issues is attracting research attention. 
However, a number of research directions (Michael, Michael, & Ip, 2008) have applied BAN 
systems in health issues for the monitoring of patients (Fouad, 2014; Kaiser & Sarrafzadeh, 
2010). Apart from WBAN, radio frequency identification (RFID) is another technology with 
great adoption potential that is being used. RFID technology is based on wireless 
communication system, which enables users to exceptionally identify tagged humans, 
anaimals or objects (Haggerty & Trottier, 2013). RFID technology relies on two physical 
components namely, readers and tags to complete it task. The readers perform the task of 
gathering information from the tags. The tags are primarily used to track individual humans, 
animals or objects. The data from the tag to a reader are transfered using radio waves 
(Awan et al., 2017). As noted by Rodriguez (2019, p. 1583) and Landt (2005, online) RFID is 
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increasingly becoming “an integral part of our life.” and ubiquitous in applications 
nowadays.  
The use of RFID applications are reported in commerce, where retailers use it in 
tracking commodities such as apparel (Yao, Schmitz, & Warren, 2005); in autombile industry 
where drivers use it in automating on-road payments (Lin, Jan, Ko, Chen, Wong & Jan, 
2004); in hospitals where managements use it in minimizing loss of equipment (Golmie, 
Cypher, & Rebala, 2005); in business firms and corporations where managers use it in 
enhancing “their supply-chain management” (Awan et al., 2017, p. 1583; Arya & Bilandi, 
2007) and, even in sports where, e.g., golfers use it in tracking lost golf balls.7  Rodriguez 
noted that nowadays, the application of RFID microchips is no longer restricted to inanimate 
objects such as goods and commodities. With the innovative application of geopositioning 
system (GPS) technology RFID systems are can be implanted subcutaneously, into pets, 
children and even employees in an organizational context (Awan et al., 2017; Kaiser & 
Sarafzadeh, 2010). Although quite limited literature exists on the appication of microchip 
digital wearable systems such as RFID and WBAN in humans living in conflict zones for 
security and humanitarian aid purposes (Saleem, Ullah & Kwak, 2011), the technology has a 
potential to impact humanitarian aid efforts toward providing safety for people living in 
armed conflict zones and for tracking kidnapped victims, for example. Hence, this paper 
proposes the application of a modified Laswell’s model of communication in manufacturing 
emerging tracking systems such as RFID and WBAN for use in humanitarian contexts.  
 
Application of Mass Communication Theory Toward Digitization of the De-Bokoharamization 
Campaign 
Putting the historical background of Boko Haram, the number of people it has killed and the 
level of damage it has caused vis-à-vis those of other terror groups (such as Al-Shabab, and 
ISIL), one can confidently say that within the 10 years of its terrorism the group has proven 
to the world that it is a very hard nut to crack. So far, nearly all critical conventional means 
and strategies of counterterrorism have been employed in the de-Bokoharamization 
campaign with moderately significant successes, but the group is still able to carry out 
successful attacks and small-scale kidnappings. Like most other terror groups, Boko Haram 
uses guerilla war tactics — and guerilla warfare is an unconventional kind of war, which 
makes it very difficult to contend (Abdulazeez, 2016; Crelinsten, 2017).  
Generally, however, when the pre-2015 and post-2015 Boko Haram terrorism 
campaigns are examined, one will realize that the Buhari Government has achieved 
tremendous success, at least by dislodging the group from their long-time base in the 
Sambisa Forest, numerically decimating them and tactically weakening them (Premium 
Times, 2015; Warner & Matfess, 2017). To further lend a helping hand to the Government in 
the de-Bokoharamization campaign especially in a media-related context, this intellectual 
brainstorming ideation is needed.  
Our modest intellectual contribution toward the de-Bokoharamization campaign 
focuses on the application of the rudiments of Harold Laswell’s (1948) model of 
communication; and it is not intended to be a panacea to the insurgency rather, this model, 
is intended to be applied in the development of an emergency incident data gathering 
system (EIDGS) in the form of wearable devices, or simply, wearables (e.g., digital bracelets, 
or e-bracelets) such a wristbands, armbands or neckbands. It should be based on global 
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positioning system (GPS) service or a special application should be developed for that 
purpose.  
We borrowed the idea of experimenting the electronic safety wearables in the de-
Bokoharamization campaign from the Saudi Kingdom innovative adoption of hi-tech safety 
measures for the Hajj pilgrims from 2016 following a massive stampede (which is one of the 
worst tragedies in the history of the Hajj pilgrimage) that occurred on September 24, 2015, 
with reports indicating that at least 2,297 pilgrims died with many of the victims 
unidentified (News18.com, 2016). Hence, this paper recommends that people living in Boko 
Haram-infested areas, or people who are highly susceptible to perceived Boko Haram 
attacks should be encouraged to wear the wearables or e-bracelets. It is expected that if this 
hi-tech safety measure is adopted and strategically applied (used), will help authorities 
provide timely succor to the victims and the security forces will be able to monitor, study 
the guerrilla-warfare behavior of the insurgents, trace their locations and do the needful 
(Moorthy et al., 2018). In addition, this hi-tech safety measure can help the troops at the 
warfront to trace the locations of hostages that wear the e-bracelets. This is a key reason 
that the wearables should be designed as miniature bracelets or wrist watches so that Boko 
Haram fighters are not able to easily identity the wearable and cause more harm or kill the 
victim. The digital bracelets should be designed as waterproof, shockproof and pressure 
resistant.  
The model is linear, and is based on the following five questions: (i) who (said), (ii) 
says what, (iii) in whch channel, (iv) to whom, (v) with what effect? A little modification to 
the model will yield the following five constructs (dimensions): (i) Source (S), (ii) Message 
(M), (iii) Channel (C), (iv) Receiver (R) and (v) Feedback (F) (SMCRF). Source produces the 
message to be communicated to the destination. Message is the concept, information, 
communication or statement (audio, visual, audio-visual, written) that is sent to the 
recipient (destination). Channel is the medium used to transmit or communicate the 
message to the destination. Receiver or destination is the person or system for whom the 
message is intended. Feedback is the reaction of the destination back to the source, which 
could be direct or indirect. The feedback may be affected by time, space, logistics, quality of 
data (message) signals received, magnitude of the incident (based on the data analysis at 
the cybernetic center), media support, social support and the Government’s determination. 
These five constructs or dimensions are operationalized as follows.  
First, Source: in the context of the present discourse, Source refers to the person 
sending the signals, that is, the attacker (Boko Haram) and the victim (e.g., a child, a farmer, 
etc.). Second, Message: regarding the attacker (Boko Haram), the message which the 
wearable captures may be rattles of gun shots or booms of improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs); while in the part of the victim the signal may be screams and yells for help or fleeing 
to safety movements, etc. Third, Channel: largely, only one channel is involved in this model, 
and it is the IEDGS wearable which the hypothetical victim (e.g., a child, woman, farmer, 
trader, etc.) wears in the form of wristband or neckband. The IEDGS wearable captures the 
signals and transmits them using GPS service or any special digital service to the Receiver. 
Fourth, Receiver: a cybernetic digital signal reception and processing center that is 
constructed for this purpose should be the destination of the signals. The center should be 
manned by cybersecurity experts from the military, or the State Security Service (SSS), or 
both. The data which are received in the form of digital signals are processed, interpreted 
and communicated to the appropriate government department or unit for subsequent 
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strategic action, e.g., military/security (feedback) action. Fifth, Feedback: after deliberate 
study and analysis of the data, the feedback may largely involve the mass and social media 
in community mobilization, public enlightenment in addition to strategic 
military/intelligence activities to trace and eliminate/capture the dodgy guerillas (Boko 
Haram) and/or rescue hostages and surviving victims that may be there. See Figure 3 for a 
graphical sketch of the modified model. 
 
 
Figure 3: A graphical representation of the modified Laswell’s Model application in de-Bokoharamization 
campaign using digital wearables (Source: Authors) 
 
Given the nature of Boko Haram’s attacks (guerilla tactics, suicide bombing, including 
kidnapping), the nature of most of the people affected by the attacks (children, women, the 
elderly, farmers, merchants) and the nature of the environment in which most of the attacks 
(and kidnapping) are carried out (countryside, rural communities, village markets), we 
believe that adopting that model in the anti-terrorism campaign will go a long way in 
proffering practicable solution to the monstrous insurgency. The Government, the military 
and other critical stakeholders should collaborate with technology developers.  
Nations cannot develop in an atmosphere devoid of peace. Peace and security of life 
are pre-requisite for development of any kind. Absence of peace, security and the presence 
of conflict in a country discourage people, governments and organizations to invest in a 
country. For example, conflict-ridden countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Israel, Libya 
and Syria would hardly attract reasonable business investments or tourists (Iyere, 2006). 
These countries share something in common: governments rarely devote public resources 
for constructive development projects capable of lifting the living standard of the people. 
With loose national security, high rate of illiteracy and youth unemployment, angry youth 
easily take to up arms against the state, something that if left poorly tackled often leads to 
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insurgency and terrorism (Istadiyantha, 2018); the Niger Delta crisis which has seriously 
affected the Nigerian economy and Boko Haram insurgency are good examples. Decrying 
human indulgence in anti-development acts that often cause unquantifiable destruction of 
life and property in society, Asogwa et al. (2012) posits: 
 
Human beings are highly endowed with the capability for development. Each 
decade gives birth to new developments to make the world a peaceful and 
enjoyable place for all. Sad enough, human beings themselves occasionally bring 
about massive destructions of what it took many years to build. By this act of 
barbarism mankind tends to slow down the wheel of progress (p. 180).  
 
 Socio-economic development in such places is put on hold with much attention and 
resources being diverted to finding solution to Boko Haram insurgency. However, with the 
introduction of amnesty and peace corridor, a lot of peace has returned to many parts of 
the North-east. Generally, the media play a pivotal role in the matrix of terrorism, 
insurgency, political violence and peace. The society puts the media into positions where 
they can magnify or minimize these kinds of acts and their perpetrators or provide coverage 
that avoids either one of those extremes (Istadiyantha, 2018; Naos, 2002). The media are 
expected to actively and proactively play the roles mentioned in the paragraphs below to 
minimize both the actual and virtual impacts (Bilgen, 2012) of terrorism. 
The Government should focus on the creation and strategic dissemination of 
counter-narrative messages aimed at dehumanizing the Boko Haram ideology of religious 
extremism over carefully selected media outlets. Even media framing, community policing 
such as that provided by local young men popularly known as Civilian JTF (CJTF) and 
vigilante groups, community outreach and public enlightenment and education, which 
involves the dissemination of purposefully designed messages to audiences have been 
shown to be effective tools for counterinsurgency.  
Looking at the alarming rate of illiteracy and poverty in the North, an effective, 
sustainable and development-oriented counterinsurgency activity will certainly involve 
addressing the economic, educational, material and psychological concerns that render 
individuals vulnerable to recruitment by the group by creating alternative motivation and 
incentive structures to dissuade people from adopting violence and extremism as ways of 
seeking redress to their grievances. The role of the media (traditional, conventional and new 
information and communication technologies, ICTs) here is to design messages aimed at 
peace-making by encouraging dialogue with the insurgents, which can serve as a salient 
function in challenging and even refuting undesired perceptions (Crelinsten, 2017; Ibrahim 
& Hassan, 2017). 
Therefore, the Nigerian Government should strengthen efforts to maintain public 
trust and public confidence, which serve as critical success drivers in any counterterrorism 
action. The evidence of this can be seen when a comparison is made between the globally 
acknowledged remarkable successes achieved in the counterinsurgency during the Buhari 
Administration, which enjoys massive public trust and confidence vis-à-vis the publicly 
decried failures recorded by the Jonathan Administration (Abdulazeez, 2016; Bloom, 
Horgan, & Winter, 2016) which had lost not only the public trust and confidence of the 
country’s citizens (Salaam, 2012) but those of the international community as well 
(Ogunnubi, Onapajo, & Isike, 2016), consequent upon which the insurgents became 
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stronger to the extent of conquering several territories (Celso, 2015) in the North-eastern 
part of the country.  
Public confidence and trust can be maintained both before and after the terrorist 
attacks if the media are employed to enlighten and educate the public about the nature and 
extent of the Boko Haram threat and propaganda, which it often spreads using video clips 
through online social networks, particularly YouTube (Antwi-Boateng, 2017) and 
occasionally, via leaflets (Forest, 2012), especially in its earlier days. Promoting peace and 
public awareness without fueling insecurity, apathy, intolerance and hatred is an essential 
element in the de-Bokoharamization campaign. Hence, counter-terrorism campaign 
messages for peace should have the right combination of not only seeking for the 
condemnation and dehumanization of the terrorists and their activities but also seeking 
protection for the vulnerable groups, e.g., women and children. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Although the development and adoption of digital microchip tracking systems in humans 
are still being investigated, their potential for application in providing safety for people 
living in armed conflict zones cannot be doubted as highlighted earlier in the review of 
literature section. The literature demonstrates that the media are always employed to wage 
psychological warfare on conflict targets through propaganda, heart-and-mind conquest 
campaigns, de-radicalization and reconciliatory efforts of providing incentives for extremists 
and insurgents to abandon violence and seek non-violence ways of seeking redress for their 
grievances. For instance, counter-narratives have been shown to be effective in this regard 
(Crelinsten, 2017). Particularly, counter-narrative messages that foster inter-Islamic sects 
understanding can tremendously undermine the propaganda and extremist ideology of 
Boko Haram which promote hatred among different Islamic sects by labelling other 
individuals and groups that do not follow their ideology as infidels (Ngige et al., 2016). It is 
believed that the recruitment and radicalization processes for all suicide bombers are 
excruciatingly emotional (Bouzar, 2016). Therefore, it is advisable that for any de-
radicalization, or de-Bokoharamization campaign to be effective and for peace to reign in 
the society, counter-narratives also must be emotional as well. 
The Government and key stakeholders should pull resources and effort together to 
render the society a less breeding ground for extremism and terrorism. Peace is an essential 
element in nation-building. Peace must be maintained at all cost; in fact, no amount of 
resources expended can be too much for the maintenance of peace and harmony in any 
society. We believe that if factors that bring about mass kidnapping by terrorist groups are 
smoked out from the society, the environment would cease becoming a breeding ground for 
terrorism in general, and suicide terrorism in particular. An individual child might be used so 
cruelly, but not large cadres of children. Deaths from suicide terrorism have been increasing. 
In fact, the actual statistical evidence for the number of suicide attacks carried out by 
women and children is just beginning to be appreciably documented, but the trend the 
attack is clear; it is a horrible development in a race that the world must not afford to lose. 
Finally, it is recommended that future research should explore the practical applicability of 
human-wearable digital media technology as an alternative means of managing armed 
conflict and human vulnerabilities. 
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